Criminal restitution should be subject to the procedural law of the Sixth Amendment, like any other criminal sanction. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the 6th Amendment recognizes that beyond a prior conviction, any fact that increases the sentence for a crime beyond the prescribed legal maximum must be submitted to a jury and is beyond a reasonable doubt. 215 In Southern Union Co. / United States, 216 As such, any fact that must increase the maximum amount of a sentence must be proven by a jury about a reasonable doubt.217 The application of the same logic leads to the indisputable conclusion that the sixth amendment should apply again. In addition to the increasing use of restitution as a means of punishment, legislators and judges have changed the method of calculating criminal restitution. The courts do not impose criminal restitution more than a mechanism to compensate for illegal profits, since restitution was created.7 Instead, the courts now impose criminal restitution to compensate for economic, emotional and psychological losses.8 As a result, the criminal restitution of the specific, tangible and economic benefits that an accused has illegitimately acquired at the expense of the victim is no longer at Serpros. The courts no longer ask for precise calculations. Rather, they use the “fudge factor” to determine the amount of restitution to be imposed in a particular case.9 Thus, criminal restitution has moved from a primaryly restorative mechanism to a primaryly punitive mechanism. While compensation corrects an economic imbalance, the penalty is a bulk compensation related to a criminal act and imposed as a result of the commission of a moral injustice. After the VWPA, criminal restitution was no longer limited to paying the victim the value of the money, property or services confiscated from the victim; Compensation could now be ordered in compensation for personal injury and over time for psychological injuries and emotional loss. For the first time, after the VWPA, when the victim suffered bodily harm, the court was able to order an accused to pay for medical, psychiatric or psychological treatment, as well as reimburse the victim for the wages lost before the conviction. 18 U.S.C No. 3579 (b) (2), (3) (1982) (current version of 18 U.S.C No.
3664 (2012)). The modern extension of criminal restitution is an example of this broader change. Traditionally, the courts used restitution, both in the civil and criminal contexts, In order to financially restore a person aggrieved by the actions of another economically aggrieved person, which prevented the involuntary beneficiary from being unjustly enriched at the expense of the aggrieved party16.16 By committing to the integration of the victim into the criminal justice process, restitution became a more frequent and predominant mechanism used in criminal hearings, as the recovery of the victim was an opportunity to involve the victim in that process.  The Supreme Court recently upheld the obvious cause of restitution decisions. See Paroline v. United States, 134 pp. Ct. 1710, 1730 (2014). However, as stated in Part II.B.3.b, the standard for determining a defendant`s financial liability remains incredibly broad, so that preliminary proceedings can determine restitution on the basis of their assessment of a defendant`s “relative culpability.” Paroline, 134 P. Ct.
circa 1734 (Roberts, C.J., derogatory). The increasing and amorphous scale of criminal restitution calls for constitutional restrictions on the extent of restitution, as illustrated by the scenario discussed in Paroline.